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Drill 1 - Site Orientation

Date: Wednesday 28 April, 0900 UTC Station: GW-01 Galway - NATS Europe Operator: You Issued by: Priya Sharma, NATS Group CSIRT

Every operator walks this once, with the consoles in front of them, before the next roster. Ten stops, one line each into the sheet. It is not a test of the fortnight; it is the fortnight written down so the next one is shorter.

  • Priya, cover note

Segment What is in it Galway examples
Space The spacecraft MERIDIAN-SAR-1, SAR-2, SAR-3
Link The RF paths up and down Ku-band downlink at 11.4-11.7 GHz; the TT&C uplink; the beacon
Ground Stations, control centres, the networks between them GW-01, SH-02, Rotterdam constellation ops, Group CSIRT
User Whoever consumes the product The imagery analysts; the customer’s tasking desk

Everything the fortnight did to us happened on the link, seen from the ground. Nothing was done to the spacecraft.

Launch and early orbit (first contact, first telemetry), commissioning (payload checkout), routine operations (passes, products, state of health), anomaly response, end of life (disposal commanding). Galway lives in the middle two and is the first and last voice for the others.

Decision Owner
Anything on the console in the next minute The operator
Holding or dropping a pass Site lead (Charlie), on the operator’s proposal
Rotating a command key out of cycle Operator proposes; constellation ops (Anneke) concurs at the far end
Zeroizing a key Nobody below CSIRT (Priya), and only on a compromise finding
Declaring an incident to the regulator Group, never the site

The ground has people, accounts, vendors, a network with an outside edge, and RF that anyone with a dish can hear or key into. The bird has none of those, and everything that commands it passes through the ground anyway.

Effect What the attacker gets April example
Deny The link does not work Uplink jammed on SAR-3
Degrade The link works worse The 11690 carrier under SAR-1
Disrupt The link works, then does not, unpredictably (none in April)
Deceive The station believes something false Spoofed GNSS time
Exploit Our own system or knowledge of it, used against us Replayed command frames; the configuration export

State what was not delivered and what decision it affected, then when the next opportunity is. C/N is the symptom on our side of the wall.

Operator workstation (M&C client) → M&C network segment → ACU, RF front end controller, modems, GPSDO, each on its own management port. The Security console watches that segment. The crypto unit sits beside it with its own path.

Availability first: the ACU runs a pass at 02:20 whether or not a patch is out. Firmware is vendor-qualified against the hardware. An agent scanning it can stall a control loop. Changes go in maintenance windows, from verified images, and are logged.

Boundary What crosses it
M&C segment / corporate network The monitoring feed, outbound only
Corporate network / internet Vendor access via the jump host, on a ticket, in a window

Nothing on the M&C segment reaches the internet directly.

Mainlobe about a degree wide at Ku-band on a 4 m dish. Sidelobe envelope tens of dB below the peak in every direction; nulls between sidelobes, narrow. No direction is deaf. On 12 April a 60 dBm emitter 24 km south-west arrived at about -90 dBm through a sidelobe while the dish pointed north at 30 degrees.

Sensitive once it leaves the site: the contact schedule, the frequency plan and configuration, key change dates, staffing and vendor visits. And the station emits: a dish pointed at the sky, a BUC keyed, a beacon locked are observable from outside. A pass is a public event to anyone watching.


Ten stops, ten lines in the sheet. The drill completes when the tenth is written.